CHAPTER 9

THREATS, STRATEGY, AND FORCE
STRUCTURE:
AN ALTERNATIVE PARADIGM FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE 21st CENTURY

Robert David Steele

While suffering substantial reductions in manpower, and failing to modernize the conventional force, the American military claims to be ready so as to support the political claims of its current master in the White House. This claim does not stand up to scrutiny. The American military is not ready, either for two simultaneous theater conflicts, or for a range of Operations Other Than War (OOTW). In fact, we have real culture shock within our military, where a serving Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff can be heard to say “Real men don’t do OOTW” at the same time that units are stretched to the breaking point while they do exactly that: OOTW in every clime and place. The other elements of our national power—the diplomatic, economic, cultural, and justice elements of our government—are also not ready to make their contribution to national security in the 21st century.

We require a comprehensive evaluation of the threat, a reconstitution of our national security strategy, and a deliberate but prompt investment in training, equipping, and organizing the forces needed to protect our nation in the 21st century. The “2+” strategy of structuring the force to address two major theater war (MTW) scenarios at once is driving our military into severe degradation. The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is not a substitute for strategy and it is bankrupting our military by diverting what disposable funds we have toward an overly technical “system of systems” that is neither financially nor militarily

sound. At the same time, RMA is creating an enormous interoperability gap—a strategic deficit—between our forces and those of allied nations, and between our commanders and the 98 percent of the relevant information they need that is in the private sector and not accessible by our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems.

This review, after evaluating the real-world threat, outlines a change in our national security strategy from 2+ to 1+iii—we need four forces after next, not one—and an increase in national security spending on the order of $40 billion a year for traditional military capabilities and $10 billion a year for nonmilitary capabilities in direct support of our long-term national security strategy. Regardless of funding, however, we need to restructure the force.

Arriving at the Bottom Line Figure.

Senator Sam Nunn, then Chairman of the Senate Armed Forces Committee, said in the 1990s, with perfect clarity:

I am constantly being asked for a bottom-line defense number. I don’t know of any logical way to arrive at such a figure without analyzing the threat; without determining what changes in our strategy should be made in light of the changes in the threat; and then determining what force structure and weapons programs we need to carry out this revised strategy.

This review follows Senator Nunn’s cogent tasking by first discussing the threat, then recommending a strategy appropriate to the threat, and finally proposing specific force structure modifications as are necessary to execute the new national security strategy, a strategy I call the “1+i” (One Plus Triple I) Strategy. This new strategy will reinforce our conventional military; substantially enhance our expeditionary, constabulary, and special operations forces; create a bold new program to achieve force protection through global intelligence coverage that inspires economic and cultural investments; and assure home front security
through a much expanded and better integrated combination of electronic security and economic counterintelligence that extends the concept of national security down to the state and local level through revolutionary new uses of our National Guard and Reserve forces.

**Analyzing the Threat.**

The “threat” to the United States in the 21st century must be evaluated in the larger context of a world where conflict is the norm, where major ethnic fault lines cut across all major continents, where transnational criminals and local warlords are amassing fortunes through trade in women, diamonds, food, and medicine; and where water—our most precious resource—is approaching a “tipping point” of nonrenewability.

Let us begin with conflict. Each day, today, we have on-going 26 severe low-intensity conflicts that killed over 300,000 people in 1999 alone, and cumulatively, have killed roughly 8 million over time. There are 78 less severe low-intensity conflicts, and over 178 violent political conflicts internal to specific nation-states. India, Nigeria, Indonesia, Pakistan, Colombia, China, Russia, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Sudan, all populous countries, are engaged in between 6 and 32 conflicts each!

Conflict trends are troubling. Severe low-intensity conflicts (defined as conflicts with over 1000 casualties per year), have leveled off. However, lesser low-intensity conflicts are increasing steadily in number each year, while violent political conflict, often ethnically-based, has leaped toward geometric increases year by year. Figure 1 shows the actual number of conflicts per year from 1995 to 2000.

In addition, relying on the aggregate data collected and analyzed by centers of excellence such as the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), we see that our world, today, endures 29 complex emergencies as
declared by the United Nations; millions of refugees and internally-displaced persons across 67 countries; food scarcity and related disease in 27 countries; modern plagues, from AIDS to the West Nile disease, creeping across 59 countries and rising; and child soldiers murdering one another in 42 countries. Peacekeeping forces are in 38 countries; landmines desecrate 62 countries; torture is common in 92 countries; corruption is common in 78 countries; and censorship is very high in 63 countries.

![Graph showing conflict trends from 1995 to 2000.](image)

**Figure 1. Conflict Trends from 1995-2000.**

Those are simply the conflicts and the obstacles to effective government management of scarce resources on behalf of their people. Let us turn to the special cases of ethnicity and water. Ethnicity, despite the popular case made for a “clash of civilizations,” is really most relevant when it is combined with desperate shortfalls in the basics of life, such as water. Figure 2 combines a map of the
current state of water for the world with genocidal fault lines corresponding to major ethnic divisions.

![Image of world map with water scarcity and genocidal fault lines indicated]

**Figure 2. Intersection of Water Scarcity and Genocidal Fault Lines.**

The coincidence of water scarcity and ethnic fault lines in the Slavic-Islamic and Slavic-Chinese border regions is of special concern. Closer to home, we must be conscious of both the increasing hyper-aridity and declining aquifers of the American mid-west, and the substantial pollution characterizing all of the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean.

The greatest threat to both national security and national prosperity in the 21st century stems from a combination of water scarcity, failed states, ethnic fault lines, and opportunistic thugs thriving under conditions of chaos. We are close to a "tipping point," and it is we who are creating the ultimate crisis that results from a combination
of global water pollution and the degradation of flood plains (no longer receiving nutrients because of dams blocking the silt) and the effects of irrigation (raising the salinity of soil to a point where it cannot produce food) and vanishing aquifers (being mined into extinction); with genocidal fault lines and the attendant instability that gives rise to rogue warriors.

Our national intelligence communities, while focusing primarily on strategic nuclear and conventional threats and those aspects of the threat that are secret, are fully aware of these dangers, but unable to make a compelling public policy case for action. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) did an excellent job of forecasting the spread of Anti-Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) in the 1970s, but the policy community was not willing to make this an international issue nor to allocate resources for preventive measures. More recently, Dr. John Gannon, Associate Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production (ADCI/AandP), has rather carefully pointed out that the major threats facing us in 2015 are related to mass migrations, disease, and other nontraditional factors. Despite a major news story on the gap between intelligence warning of AIDS in the 1970s and policy action on AIDS for a quarter century thereafter, Dr. Gannon’s accurate and timely warning about emerging nonmilitary threats is being ignored.

At the same time, selected experts and the occasional rare reporter have begun to focus on “modern plagues” as well as water shortages, but they do so only within their professional circles and fail to get a hearing at the policy level. Even those books that receive presidential and broadcast television endorsements, such as Laurie Garrett’s *Betrayal of Trust: The Collapse of Global Public Health* (Hyperion, 2000), fail to affect the national and other state budgets for the simple reason that the voters—the citizens—will not buy a 754-page book, much less read it, and still less act upon its well-documented and urgent
message. The heart of Garrett's message merits our attention.

In this context we must acknowledge the importance of the new definition adopted by the United Nations in Security Council Resolution 751 of April 24, 1992, where the "magnitude of human suffering" in Somalia was recognized as constituting a threat to peace and security. We do this for two reasons: because such suffering creates waves of migration that carry disease, and because our "home defenses" against epidemics have been allowed to atrophy to the point that we are at serious risk in the developed world and at the provincial, state, and local levels.

The threat in the 21st century is more complex than ever before and cannot be defined in strictly military terms. Figure 3 provides a means of understanding this complexity while structuring the threat in a manner that leads logically to both strategic and force structure equivalencies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HIC</th>
<th>High Intensity Conflict</th>
<th>SOLIC</th>
<th>Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MRC</td>
<td>Major Regional Conflict</td>
<td>LEA</td>
<td>Law Enforcement Agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C4I</td>
<td>Command, Control, Communications,</td>
<td>Jihad</td>
<td>Religious conflict, also includes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Computing and Intelligence</td>
<td></td>
<td>environmental, non-state &quot;war&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 3. Four Threat Classes Requiring Strategic Consideration.**
In fact we face four general kinds of threats: the traditional nuclear and conventional forces sponsored by a state; those that are violent but not necessarily associated with a state, including both transnational criminals and terrorists or warlords able to acquire weapons of mass destruction; those that are nonviolent and often stateless, including environmental conditions imposing a high "magnitude of human suffering" as well as the refugees—often gravely ill—from those conditions, the child soldiers bound into armed slavery, and the women and children traded for money and often laden with disease; and finally those threats to home defense, be they state-sponsored or not, that surround our critical infrastructures, including our public health infrastructure, and the core of our economic well-being. At times, it is ourselves that we have to blame for the scope and imminence of our vulnerability, as is the case with public health.

Seen another way, these four threat classes confront us with four distinct "ways of war": Systemic War, Dirty War, Peacewar, and Cyberwar. Further complicating our planning and programming, conflict between differing forces takes differing forms, and we must evaluate how they fight and how we might fight in the context of a world that does not favor heavy armor formations—a world in which only 50 percent of the ports are usable, where there is almost no cross-country mobility, bridge loading is limited to 30 tons and less in most Third World countries, and the aviation climate is hot and humid.

**Changing the Strategy.**

Fundamental strategic thinking should include an appreciation for the fact that a national security strategy must be *holistic*—managing all sources of national power including diplomacy, economic assistance, cultural outreach, and information operations, not just the military—simultaneously. "War proper" is not just about military force, but rather about imposing one's will and
assuring one’s security in a complex world. Within this larger context, power without purpose is wasted, time is priceless, technology is not a substitute for strategy or thinking, asymmetric threats must receive co-equal attention with symmetric threats, and strategic culture matters.

Determining our national security strategy for the 21st century therefore must be guided by two related principles: co-equal standing for asymmetric versus symmetric threats; and co-equal structure and funding, or at least some semblance of a rational balance, between military forces designed for the traditional symmetric threat, and largely unconventional or nonmilitary forces designed to deal with the asymmetric threat.

On this basis, “forward engagement” and “shaping” of the theater environment make a great deal of sense, but with two enormous caveats: there must be a force structure as well as funding for nonmilitary investments, and we are probably better off talking about “nurturing” peaceful environments instead of the more imperial “shaping.” At a minimum, a strategy that is seriously committed to force protection through economic, cultural, and information peacekeeping must recognize the vital role played by the nongovernmental organizations (NGO); the critical importance of being able to communicate and cooperate with indigenous organizations that are not part of a military force; and the overwhelming influence on any situation of environmental conditions including the availability of clean drinking water, sufficient food for the children, and such medical provisions as might be needed to at least keep disease from spreading through epidemics.

Our new national security strategy must actually have five elements that are in complete harmony with one another: our global intelligence strategy, for ensuring that we can maintain global coverage and global warning; our interoperability strategy, for ensuring that what we build and buy is interoperable with both military and civilian
coalition partners in a wide variety of “come as you are” circumstances; our force structure strategy for ensuring that we build to both the most likely as well as the worst case threats while balancing the relative roles of our military, the rest of the Federal government, the reserve force, the private sector, and external allies or coalition partners; our preventive diplomacy strategy for directly addressing conditions around the globe that spawn conflict and crises; and finally, our home front strategy for fully developing and integrating the defensive capabilities of our state and local governments and the private sector.

A truly "transformative" defense strategy would recognize that in this complex world with four threat classes we must adopt a “total mobilization” approach to national security, and ensure that every element of government at the federal, state, and local levels is empowered and integrated into an effective “total force” while we also ensure that the private sector is doing its part, particularly in relation to documenting supply-chain vulnerability for high-technology forces and in applying new “due diligence” electronic security measures to raise the over-all security of our national financial, communications, power, and transportation infrastructures. Figure 4 illustrates the kinds of trade-offs that must be made if we are to have a "transformative" force structure strategy.

Without spending too much time on these trade-offs, let us just note that there are three kinds of trade-offs shown in the figure: between the military and the rest of government; between the active force and the reserve force; and between the government as a whole and the private sector. We will leave the issue of U.S. versus allied or U.S. versus NGO coalition levels of effort for another day.

"Real WAR" (HIC/MRC) forces must protect the core military and rely almost completely on active duty personnel "ready to go" without waiting for reservists; and will draw on private sector capabilities to the minimal extent possible.
SOLIC/LEA forces, by contrast, will see the U.S. Government (USG) fielding an even mix of military and diplomatic or justice or economic capabilities, while also drawing equally on active and reserve forces, and dividing the responsibility for dealing with terrorism and transnational crime equally between U.S. Government endeavors and private sector security and intelligence activities.

In peace, the military continues to provide a global logistics and communications infrastructure, but civilian elements of the U.S. Government are in the majority role. Reservists skilled at foreign languages and with occupations vital to civil affairs and the restructuring of failed states come to the fore, while the overall effort is balanced between USG-funded and manned activities, and "overt action" by private sector elements including NGOs.

Finally, for IO/ECON, there remains a 20 percent commitment of military forces—largely in the National Security Agency (NSA) and related service information warfare centers—while the Justice, Treasury, and other departments come to the fore; there is an even split between active duty forces carrying out Information Operations
duties, and elements of the National Guard carefully positioned across all critical infrastructure nodes, with the funding—and the ultimate responsibility for day-to-day security—resting primarily with the private sector.

On the basis of this kind of approach, one can readily validate a need for four regional Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) (Pacific, Southern, European, and Central) while conceptualizing four "threat-type" Commanders-in-Chief (WAR, SOLIC, PEACE, and HOME). It would be these eight CINCs that should comprise the working level of the new Joint Requirements Board under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Such a force structure strategy would at a minimum restructure the relationships between the Departments of Defense, Justice, and State; would establish minimal mandatory defense structure needs within the Departments of Commerce, Treasury, and Transportation as well as the Federal Reserve; and would create selective new relationships—including secure interoperable communications networks—with state and local agencies, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and such other civilian elements of government as must be better integrated into our "total force" strategy. The president's immediate staffs—the National Security Council and National Economic Council and other odds and ends—should also be restructured to conform to the need for matrixed management of integrated operations against each of the four threat classes. Such a force strategy would also establish, in clear terms suitable for a news media report as well as legislation, the minimal mandatory responsibilities of the private sector in support of our national security strategy, with a special emphasis on very high standards for electronic security.

An integrated national security strategy, then, must carefully develop, in tandem and with appropriate fiscal resources as well as force structure being assured for each
element of this *holistic* strategy, each of the following: a
global intelligence strategy; an interoperability strategy; a
force structure strategy; a preventive diplomacy strategy
(including economic assistance and cultural programs); and
a home front strategy. Those who would persist in limiting
our national security strategy emphasis to conventional
military forces are demeaning Clausewitz and undermining
the security of the nation.

**Determining the Force Structure.**

A national security strategy that addresses all of these
factors, with all of the legal, financial, and political
implications that are associated with different kinds of
"engagement," must inevitably find that we need four forces
after next, not one.

While it is certainly possible to have one "core force" that
includes the world-wide mobility, logistics, and
communications capabilities that we are justly proud of, in
fact our strategy must find that we need:

- a nuclear and conventional force that is smaller but
very well equipped, fully modernized, and never committed
to OOTW—the WAR force;

- expanded and enhanced expeditionary, constabulary,
and special operations forces able to put increasing force
packages anywhere in the world within 24 to 48 to 72
hours—the SOLIC force including direct support to LEA;

- a PEACE force, possibly combining substantial
elements of the Civil Affairs, Army Engineers, and the
Agency for International Development with new liaison
elements specially trained to interact with civilian rescue
units, as well as a new humanitarian assistance fleet within
the U.S. Navy and also new Air Force lift capabilities
relevant to peacekeeping; and finally,

- a fully developed HOME Defense force that gives state
and local authorities, not just federal authorities,
everything they need to legally carry out their duties in preventing economic espionage and electronic attack against any of our critical infrastructures, while integrating the U.S. Coast Guard and appropriate national missile defense and other “continental” defense capabilities.

We cannot rely any longer on just the military, or on a “one size fits all” military where our people and equipment are assigned to all kinds of missions for which they have not been trained, equipped, and organized.

The “Core Force,” as opposed to General Colin Powell’s “Base Force” approach, draws a distinction between core functionalities and capabilities that are needed for a global presence—communications, logistics, mobility, manpower management—and very distinct and carefully focused force structures and organizational arrangements that are self-sustaining and are very deliberately trained, equipped, and organized for optimal effectiveness in one of the eight “core competency” areas shown in Figure 5 below.

![Figure 5. "Core Force" Visualization.](image-url)
Eight Functionalities, Four "Type" CINCs.

Each of these eight functionalities should be actualized in corresponding force structure initiatives.

Strategists. Our national Net Assessment capability, and our national as well as our military strategic formulation processes, have broken down. They have become bureaucratic exercises of little value to long-term force structure planning. They are weak in part because no one has been willing to challenge the many false assumptions and premises that guide our current force structure decisionmaking process. We need, at a minimum, a dedicated National Security Strategic Center that has an even mix of representatives from each of the major slices of national power, as well as an even mix between long-term strategic thinkers specializing in each of the four threat classes, and "top 5 percent” personnel from the military, other elements of the civilian government, state and local law enforcement and public health, and the private sector, with special regard for selected nongovernmental and nonprofit sectors. This element should report directly to a new Presidential Council but be managed on a day-to-day basis by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Domestic Threat. FEMA has improved incrementally in recent years, but needs a great deal more authority and financial support. We need to redirect a substantial portion of the National Guard toward national, state, and local emergency response duties, and to give them the training, equipment, and organization that they require to become extremely effective at dealing with fires, riots, and epidemics, in direct support of the constituted legal authorities being assisted. From communications to medical to civil engineering to public relations to food services, there are valid requirements that demand a "total make-over" for those elements of the National Guard fortunate enough to be selected for this very urgent and honorable aspect of national defense. This force, to include new investments in active duty personnel as a cadre and law
enforcement specialists as well, should be under a “type” CINC for Home Front Defense who would also be responsible for Electronic Security and Citizen Education as discussed below, as well as for the national missile defense system as it develops over time.

**Force on Force.** This is the traditional military, responsible for creating the maximum amount of violence in the smallest possible space—responsible for being able to execute “scorched earth” missions that obliterate entire cities if necessary, that can control significant areas of terrain in order to find and kill exactly the right key personnel threatening the United States with anything from transcontinental missiles to bio-chemical car bombs. This force must receive all that the RMA can offer it, while also being protected from OOTW missions and other distractions. This force, under the leadership of a specific CINC responsible for the “total war” mission, should take over the bulk of the existing defense funding, and focus exclusively on maintaining its readiness while modernizing aggressively. This force must have air-ground task forces dedicated to specific regions of the world and at least one complete Corps specifically trained for each of the four major terrain types over which major wars might be fought: desert, jungle, mountain, and urban. Selected elements of all of the other forces (e.g. small wars, constabulary) would pre-plan and train for specific contingency missions in support of a Major Regional Conflict (MRC) campaign, and in the event of an MRC, would be chopped as required to the operational control of the regional CINC who would also receive operational control of force on force elements.

**Small Wars.** We keep forgetting our history. Both the British and the Americans have learned the same lesson more than once: forces designed for traditional conflicts do not do well in small wars until they have undergone such considerable adaptation as to render them unprepared and ineffective when required to return to traditional warfare. Small wars require a much higher standard of foreign area knowledge and language competency, to name just one
significant difference, and are best fought by units trained, equipped, and organized specifically for small wars. The Special Operations Command (SOCOM) is ideally suited by both its strategic culture and its tactical excellence, to serve as the parent of a force of three division-wing teams optimized for expeditionary operations. This force would be especially skilled at joining international coalitions engaged in peace enforcement operations, and in executing violent complex forced entry missions.

\textit{Constabulary}. The force that fights the small wars is \textit{not} the force best able to maintain the peace, restore the functions of the failed state, and generally move as quickly as possible toward an exit that has been planned by the original engagement strategy. Constabulary forces require a combination of enormous numbers of civil affairs personnel, very high percentages of military police, engineering, medical, and food service personnel, and considerable communications, intelligence, and liaison personnel. This force must draw on and implement major civilian programs related to water purification and desalination, food purity and distribution, and epidemic conditions. This force must excel at working with and sustaining long-term relations with NGOs—a major challenge where our traditional intelligence and operations leaders have failed completely. It has to fully integrate indigenous personnel into every aspect of its reconstruction of society and the eventual turn-over of authority to indigenous leaders. It has to provide considerable training in many skill areas, and at the same time needs to plan for a deliberate abandonment of most of its equipment, including communications equipment, as part of "the deal." This force would then return to the Continental United States (CONUS) to reconstitute itself. It should be under CINC SOLIC.

\textit{Ground Truth}. The average Embassy officer is not trained, equipped, nor suited by nature to go in harm's way on a daily basis. Most of what we need to know in the Third World is not published at all, much less in digital form or in
English. Our increasingly complex world requires that we have a force for establishing "ground truth" through direct personal observation, in every clime and place. Such a force, created in the defense attaché mode but with much greater freedom of movement and much deeper mobility and communications support, would integrate overtly as assigned liaison officers; "circuit riders" assigned to entire countries or regions and told to stay out of the Embassy and off of the cocktail circuit; and very selective networks of clandestine and covert observers using third party passports or surreptitious entry to obtain their direct "ground truth" observations including sensitive measurements and signatures intelligence (MAS\INT). This force should be under CINC SOLIC, but in keeping with my recommendations for overall intelligence reform there should be a major Clandestine Services Agency (CSA) Station co-located with CINC SOLIC to ensure optimal coordination between these "early warning" observations by warriors focused on rural areas, and the more traditional civilian clandestine espionage activities focused on urban political and economic and military targets.

*Electronic Security.* We have a very long way to go before it is truly safe to live and work in cyberspace. Our financial, communications, power, and transportation infrastructures remain totally exposed and vulnerable for the simple reason that we will not be secure until there is a wholesale conversion of all existing electronic systems to a high level of security that must be embedded from the factories of the components on out. This will require three major national initiatives that are not yet being properly discussed in Washington: 1) the definition of minimal mandatory standards for hardware, software, and personnel security in relation to electronic systems and their contents; 2) the imposition of these standards via "due diligence" legislation that requires all enterprises to be compliant within 5 years, with some systems to be secure within the year; and 3) the complete release of NSA-level encryption to the private sector so that the Internet can be as secure as Presidential
communications. This level of security on the Internet is in fact a precursor to enabling the intelligence community as well as corporations to have access to all relevant information while still being able to process secrets. The minuscule effort being made today must be supplanted by a trained force responsive to CINC HOME, and electronic security brigades specializing respectively in financial, communications, power, and transportation systems, that are in turn integrated within a nationally distributed "virtual network" of private sector employees, National Guard specialists, and Home Front Force active duty cadre in new consolidated electronic operations centers focused on each of the major systems areas.

_Citizen Education._ "A Nation's best defense is an educated citizenry." As Senator Boren and David Gergen have noted so clearly, we are in fairly desperate circumstances in relation to both policymaker and voter knowledge about the hard realities of the world we live in. A major investment must be made in the "internationalization of education," but even more so, we must find ways to better integrate our increasingly diversified population so as to create a minimal level of social cohesion over time. It is my view that we must restore the draft and require every U.S. citizen to serve for 4 years, in any combination of years (e.g. 2 + 2 or 1 x 4) between their 18th and 38th birthdays, with at least basic training and the first year being required before entering college. I must go further and in recognition of both the middle-aged immigration increases as well as the longevity increases, and say that we must have an additional draft requiring 2 years of service (at once or in stints of 3-6 months) from all those who are citizens in their 38th to 58th years and have not served previously. At the same time, we must substantially increase private sector sabbaticals by our field grade officers and selected senior non-commissioned officers. We must, in effect, give true meaning to the concept of "total force" by ensuring that every single citizen has a common foundation of service to the nation, and that we fully integrate every citizen—to the
extent of their capabilities—into our national defense. This educational process does not require that every citizen bear arms—our new national defense force structure will offer many opportunities for those who do not wish to wear a uniform or learn how to kill.

In summary, all but one of these eight functions would be integrated under one of four “type” CINCs that would in turn support the regional CINCs much as the services do today but with a vastly improved focus of effort that assures both air-ground-sea interoperability as well as joint training and doctrine suited to the specific “type” of warfare to be fought. Over time we should convert each of the four Services into one of the type CINCs, or disband them as we downsize administrative capabilities and improve our tooth-to-tail competency under this new force structure approach.

Reordering the Government.

As Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., has noted, we need to do a much better job of organizing the rest of the government so that it is capable of “forward engagement” using all of the sources of national power. This should require, at a minimum, the establishment of Ambassadorial-level appointments to each regional CINC from Commerce, Treasury, the Peace Corps, and the Agency for International Development, and up-grading of the existing Political Advisor positions from State to Assistant Secretary-equivalents.

A new CINC PEACE, as a “type” CINC, should be established with a small staff in the National Capital Area, close to the Department of State, and able to draw on military command and staff personnel as well as military dollars to ease the transition toward the day when we have proper funding and structure for the nonmilitary elements of national power. Someone like General Colin Powell or Admiral William Crowe, Jr., would be ideal candidates to serve as CINC PEACE, with international education,
water, food, and public health as the mandated areas of interest, and the right to cut across bureaucratic boundaries, on behalf of the President, when it makes sense to do so. Eventually, once we have our national security house in order, we will find that a similar restructuring of government is necessary with respect to health, education, interior, and other domestic elements of government responsible for the internal “commonwealth.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CINC WAR</th>
<th>CINC SOLIC</th>
<th>CINC PEACE</th>
<th>CINC HOME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Force on Force</td>
<td>Small Wars</td>
<td>State/USIA</td>
<td>Domestic Threat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constabulary</td>
<td>Peace Corps</td>
<td>Electronic Security</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground Truth</td>
<td>Economic Aid</td>
<td>Citizen Education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 6. Reconstitution of Force Structure.**

Some of the features of each of the ten force structure components of a new national security “total force” are shown below.

**CINCWAR**

- **Force on Force**
  - Existing strategic nuclear forces, drawn down as appropriate, but modernized
  - Four Army-Air Force Corps of 3 division-wing teams each (12 and 12)
  - Strategic mobility (black and gray) to move one corps in 4 weeks
CINCSOC

• Small Wars
  • Complete absorption of the U.S. Marine Corps, without dilution of its Congressionally-mandated character or culture including uniforms
  • Implementation of the 450-ship Navy (rapid response, littoral squadrons)
  • Creation of two active/ four Reserve foreign area combat support brigades

• Constabulary
  • Five active and five Reserve constabulary task forces
  • Implementation of the 450-ship Navy (humanitarian assistance slice)

• Ground Truth
  • Ten Reserve foreign area specialist companies
  • Ten Reserve ground sensor /relay communications platoons (covert capable)

CINCPACE

• State/USIA
  • 1000 additional foreign service/foreign information officers
  • 100 new consular/open source information posts

• Peace Corps
• 10,000 new Peace Corps volunteers per year

• Implementation of Peace Corps information assistance program

• **Economic Aid**

  • 10 new water, food, and medicine projects each year (2 within USA)

  • Digital Marshall Plan for the Third World

**CINCHOME**

• **Domestic Threat**

  • 50 National Guard Brigades, each with fire, riot, engineer, and medical battalions that train with state and local counterparts and also do international humanitarian assistance and disaster relief

  • National missile defense for New York and Washington as soon as possible

  • Absorption of the U.S. Coast Guard, without dilution of its character

• **Electronic Security**

  • 50 National Guard Electronic Security Centers

  • 50 National Guard Electronic Security Battalions, with specialist companies

• **Citizen Education**

  • University of the Republic
Universal Draft/National Defense Fellowship Program

This approach to managing how we train, equip, and organize our varying force structures to deal with four distinct threat challenges wipes out, in one grand "Goldwater-Nichols"-style revolution, all of the negatives of the existing Service "stovepipe" acquisition systems and the cultures that go with them. This should be the focus of the National Security Act of 2001.

Conclusion.

Both the RMA and the so-called defense transformation movements have failed. The 2+ MRC strategy has failed. Our security environment demands a Home Front Force; a Peace Force; a Ground Truth, Small Wars and Constabulary Force; and a dedicated strategic nuclear and conventional War Force that is not frittered away on OOTW.

We require a National Security Act of 2001. This strategy, and the attendant force structure, are achievable within 6 years from where we are today, but will not be achievable as readily if we delay because the U.S. Navy is decommissioning ships as we speak—we must put a stop to their dismantling of our submarine, destroyer, and frigate capabilities because it is the U.S. Navy, as CINC PEACE, that will have the greatest burden to bear in support of CINC SOLIC (U.S. Marine Corps) and CINC WAR (U.S. Army). We must give CINC HOME (the U.S. Air Force) the financial resources—and culturally-powerful incentives—with which to rapidly reconfigure itself into an effective Home Front Defense that fully integrates and respects the needs and concerns of our state and local and private sector partners in our "total war" environment.

If we adopt a 1+iii strategy and implement the recommendations of this review, America will begin the 21st century with a national security architecture
well-suited to our needs and agile—able to fight and win in any clime or place.